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1. Introduction 
The most prominent argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism is 
Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument (e.g., 1975, 1983, 1989). In this paper, I offer 
a new diagnosis of what is wrong with this argument. Both proponents and critics of the 
argument typically accept the way it is framed and only disagree on whether the 
argument’s premises and the rules of inference on which it relies are true. I suggest that 
the argument involves a category mistake: it conflates two different levels of description, 
namely the physical level at which we describe the world from the perspective of 
fundamental physics and the agential level at which we describe agents and their actions. 
My diagnosis is based on an account of free will as a higher-level phenomenon that was 
developed in List (2014).2 I will call this account ‘compatibilist libertarianism’, for 
reasons that will become clear below.3 
                                                
1 C. List, Departments of Government and Philosophy, LSE; autumn 2015: Harvard Law School. This 
paper can be cited as an online draft. I am very grateful to Jonathan Birch, Robert Kane, and Eddy Nahmias 
for helpful written comments on this paper, and to Daniel Dennett, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, and Laura Valentini for helpful conversations. I have learnt much from my collaboration with 
Marcus Pivato on a related project (List and Pivato 2015). I also greatly benefitted from conversations with 
the late Peter Menzies and wish to take this opportunity to express my admiration for Peter’s work and also 
to refer readers to his own, distinct analysis of the consequence argument (Menzies forthcoming). My work 
has been supported by a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship. 
2 Important precursors of this account are Anthony Kenny’s (1978) and Daniel Dennett’s (2003) accounts, 
which also stress the higher-level nature of free will. I will here, however, use the framework in List 
(2014), where an explicit formal model of different levels of description is developed; the framework was 
further extended in List and Pivato (2015). The present paper advances beyond this earlier work by 
explicitly addressing, and responding to, van Inwagen’s consequence argument. As several critics have 
pointed out (in correspondence and in discussions), this is an important gap that needs to be filled. 
3 To the best of my knowledge, the label ‘compatibilist libertarianism’ is not yet established in the 
philosophical literature. I am aware of only one occurrence of the term in a scholarly publication, namely in 
an article on Locke by Rickless (2000). Some other combinations of compatibilism and libertarianism have 
been defended under the label ‘libertarian compatibilism’ by Vihvelin (2000) and Arvan (2013). Vihvelin 
(2013) also explicitly highlights the challenge to explain ‘what’s wrong with the Consequence Argument’ 
(p. 18) and then develops offers her own distinct response to that challenge. Beebee and Mele (2002) 
investigate a form of Humean compatibilism (which combines a Humean account of the laws of nature with 
the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism) and identify similarities between this form of 
compatibilism and libertarianism. For an overview of the literature on free will, see the handbook edited by 
Kane (2002), especially Kane’s introduction. 
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2. The consequence argument  
Let me begin with van Inwagen’s argument (following the exposition in van Inwagen 
1989; see also Vihvelin 2011). At its centre is a modal operator called ‘N’. For any 
proposition p, let Np mean ‘p is true, and there is nothing anyone could have done to 
make it false’. Van Inwagen proposes two rules of inference: 
Rule Alpha: From !p infer Np, where ! is an ordinary necessity operator, 
standing for ‘true in all possible worlds’. 
Rule Beta: From Np and N(p→q) infer Nq, where → is the material-
implication arrow. 
Let p0 be a proposition that describes the fully specified physical state of the world at 
some time in the remote past. Let l be a proposition that describes the fundamental laws 
of physics. And let p be a proposition that describes a particular agent’s action that we are 
interested in: an action of which we wish to know whether it was freely performed. The 
idea is that the action was freely performed only if it is not true that Np. The argument 
now goes as follows: 
Step 1: !((p0 & l) → p) (from determinism) 
Step 2: !(p0 → (l → p)) (from step 1 and logic) 
Step 3: N(p0 → (l → p)) (from Rule Alpha) 
Step 4: Np0   (a premise) 
Step 5: N(l → p)  (from steps 3, 4, and Rule Beta) 
Step 6: Nl   (a premise) 
Step 7: Np   (from steps 5, 6, and Rule Beta) 
In short, determinism implies Np, which in turn implies that the action described by p is 
not free. If we grant van Inwagen’s two inference rules, the argument is valid, and the 
two premises on which it rests – namely Np0 and Nl – are hard to reject. So, determinism 
seems incompatible with free will.  
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3. What can be said in response?  
Incompatibilists typically grant some version of the argument and conclude that there 
could be no free will in a deterministic world. Libertarians further hold that determinism 
is false and that there is in fact free will. Compatibilists, by contrast, tend to reject the 
argument. Some offer a compatibilist reinterpretation of the N operator under which Rule 
Alpha no longer applies. For example, we could adopt a ‘conditional’ interpretation of an 
agent’s ability, under which Np is interpreted to mean that if the agent had attempted to 
act otherwise, then he or she would have succeeded and p would not have been true.4 
This conditional can be true even if, in the actual world, the agent necessarily did not 
attempt to act otherwise. All that is needed for the truth of the conditional is that its 
consequent is true (i.e., not-p) in all nearest, albeit counterfactual, worlds in which the 
antecedent is true (i.e., the agent attempted to act otherwise). And so, Rule Alpha is 
blocked under the current reinterpretation of Np. Other compatibilists reject Rule Beta, 
pointing out, for instance, that it would licence some problematic inferences. A further 
response is to deny that the action can count as free only if Np is false. This response 
might appeal to those who hold that free will does not require alternative possibilities. 
Here, however, I will set these familiar compatibilist objections to the argument aside (for 
a survey, see Vihvelin 2011) and offer a different response. 
I will focus on a key feature of the argument whose significance is seldom 
acknowledged. The argument involves two different kinds of propositions, which include 
two different kinds of modal notions. It involves, on the one hand, propositions about the 
fully specified physical state of the world and what it necessitates under the laws of 
physics and, on the other hand, propositions about the actions an agent could or could not 
perform. And it combines physical and agential ideas via certain ‘mixed’ propositions, 
such Np0, Nl, and N(p0 → (l → p)), which place propositions referring to fundamental 
physics within the scope of the N operator. The argument therefore presupposes that there 
is a unified level of description at which we can 
(i) adequately talk about both fundamental physics and intentional 
agency, and   
                                                
4 For a recent defence of the conditional interpretation of abilities, see Menzies (forthcoming). 
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(ii) combine propositions asserting fundamental physical facts with 
operators capturing agential abilities. 
If we did not have such a level of description at our disposal, the argument could not be 
properly expressed. For the argument to be well formed, we must be able to express all its 
constituent propositions in a unified language.  
From a philosopher’s armchair, it is easy to consider this presupposition innocuous 
or even to miss the fact that there is such a presupposition. The combination of ordinary 
language and elementary logic in which the argument is standardly formulated seems to 
allow us to talk seamlessly about everything ranging from elementary particles to human 
abilities. Yet, I will suggest, the argument’s presupposition does not withstand scrutiny. 
The argument involves a category mistake, illicitly mixing fundamental-physics talk and 
agency talk. 
4. Why the argument’s presupposition is problematic 
Let us ask what we would need to do to spell out the consequence argument more 
precisely. We would have to employ scientifically exact language to express each of the 
propositions occurring in it. Propositions p0 and l are supposed to describe the full 
physical state of the world at a particular time and the fundamental laws of physics, and 
so they would need to be expressed using the resources of our best theory of fundamental 
physics. Presumably, we would need to use concepts such as elementary particles, fields, 
and forces, and various equations capturing their dynamics over time. Along with this, 
the necessity operator ! would have to express a modal notion suitable for fundamental 
physics. Up to this point, the language of fundamental physics seems to be the right one.  
But now consider proposition p, which is meant to describe a particular agent’s 
action, and the operator N, which is meant to refer to what some agents could or could 
not have done. Recall that Np means ‘p is true, and there is nothing anyone could have 
done to make it false’. Neither intentional actions nor agents’ abilities are things we can 
talk about in the language of fundamental physics. In that language, we cannot even talk 
about tables, trees, and chairs – only about particles, fields, forces, and so on.5 Agency-
                                                
5 As philosophers of chemistry have pointed out, it is questionable whether even simple chemical concepts 
such as acidity can be re-expressed in fundamental physical terms. See, e.g., Manafu (forthcoming). 
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related concepts, like belief, desire, intention, and choice, are absent from fundamental 
physics. A sentence such as ‘Christian prefers reading books to watching movies, so he 
chooses the former over the latter’ does not belong to the language of fundamental 
physics, to give a simple example.6 
Consequently, if we wish to talk about agents and their actions, we must switch to a 
language of psychology, specifically one in which concepts pertaining to intentional 
agency can be expressed, together with the relevant modal notions: the agential ‘can’.7 
Even the language of neuroscience may be too low-level for that. At best, we may be able 
to use it to describe the neural correlates of intentional thought and action, but those 
neural correlates must not be mistaken for the higher-level psychological phenomena they 
underpin. As many philosophers have argued, we must not confuse the brain with the 
mind. The brain is a bio-physical system, in which certain neural processes take place. 
The mind is a higher-level phenomenon, which, plausibly, supervenes on the brain but 
cannot be identified with it. It is the brain that supports neural processes, and the mind 
that thinks (for a discussion, see, e.g., Bennett, Dennett, Hacker, and Searle 2007). 
It should be clear, then, that fundamental-physics talk and intentional-agency talk 
operate at two different levels of description. We cannot use the language of fundamental 
physics to speak of what agents can and cannot do, just as we cannot use the language of 
psychology, or that of any other special science, to describe the fully specified physical 
state of the world and the fundamental laws of nature. What is more, each level of 
description comes with its own modal notions: physical possibility and necessity are not 
the same as chemical possibility and necessity; and chemical possibility and necessity, in 
turn, are not the same as biological possibility and necessity, and so on. 
We can now observe three points. First, if we tried to formulate the consequence 
argument in fundamental physical terms, we would not express proposition p and the N 
operator adequately, because these belong to the agential level. Second, if we tried to 
formulate the argument in agential-level terms, we would not express propositions p0 and 
l as well as the necessity operator ! adequately, because these belong to the fundamental 
physical level. And third, it is doubtful whether ‘mixed’ propositions such as Np0, Nl, 
                                                
6 As discussed later, this is not to deny that agency-facts supervene on physical facts. 
7 For a recent discussion of agentive modalities, see also Maier (2015). 
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N(l→p), and N(p0 → (l → p)) are well-formed at all, because N and p are agential-level 
expressions, while p0 and l are physical-level ones. In short, the consequence argument 
mixes two levels of description that do not go together. 
5. The nature of the disconnect between the physical and the agential levels 
A critic might object that I am postulating too much of a disconnect between the physical 
and the agential levels. However, what I am arguing is entirely consistent with the view 
that everything in the world, including the phenomenon of intentional agency, supervenes 
on the physical. My claim is only that the physical and the agential levels are 
conceptually distinct: we employ a different conceptual repertoire at each of these levels, 
along with different level-specific modal notions. The picture that I am defending is one 
of supervenience without conceptual reducibility. (For related discussions of the level-
specificity of special-science phenomena, see also List and Pivato 2015 and Glynn 2010.)   
According to non-reductive physicalism, which I accept for present purposes, the 
relationship between the physical and the agential levels is the following. Agential 
properties supervene on physical properties, but are multiply realizable. So, although 
agential-level facts are completely settled by underlying physical facts, agential-level 
descriptions are more coarse-grained than physical-level ones. Special sciences such as 
psychology (but also chemistry, biology, etc.) deliberately abstract away from micro-
physical details. They do this for perfectly good scientific reasons, in order to be able to 
focus on and explain the macro-patterns they are concerned with. An agential property 
such as a particular person’s holding the belief that Obama is the President of the United 
States or forming the intention to drink a coffee might be realized by numerous different 
configurations of underlying physical properties and might be equivalent, at most, to an 
unwieldy disjunction of physical properties. What plays an explanatory role from an 
agential perspective is the coarse-grained agential property, not its micro-physical 
realizer. Within the language of physics, we may not even be able to come up with a 
precise formal expression to capture the ‘wild disjunction’ of micro-physical properties to 
which the agential property might correspond. Agential-level descriptions involve 
concepts that do not map neatly onto corresponding concepts in physics, and vice versa, 
even though agential-level facts are fully determined by physical ones. (The multiple-
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realizability point, now widely accepted, goes back to Fodor 1974 and Putnam 1975.8 For 
a recent defence of non-reductive physicalism, see List and Menzies 2009.) 
6. A simple model 
To make the relationship between the physical and the agential levels formally precise, I 
use a simple model in which the world is represented as a dynamical system (drawing on 
List 2014).9 The system is in a particular state at each point in time, and that state may 
change over time. Let S denote the set of all possible physical states, which are each fully 
specified and mutually exclusive. Let T denote the set of all points in time, where T is 
linearly ordered. A physical history is a temporal path of the system through its state 
space, formally a function, denoted h, from T into S, which assigns to each point in time 
the corresponding state. We can interpret each history as a possible world described at the 
physical level. Let Ω denote the set of all possible physical histories; this could be either 
the universal set of all logically possible functions from T into S or, more plausibly, a set 
consisting of only those functions that are permitted by the laws of physics. Physical-
level propositions are, extensionally speaking, subsets of Ω, though of course we 
normally use sentences in a suitable language to express them.10 A proposition p is true at 
some history h if and only if h is contained in the relevant subset.  
To introduce modal operators such as ! (necessity) and ! (possibility), we need to 
define an accessibility relation between the elements of Ω. Whether one history is 
accessible from another depends on the time in question. Let us say that history h is 
accessible from history h' at time t if and only if the two histories have the same initial 
                                                
8 Giving an example from economics, Fodor (1974, p. 103) illustrates the problem as follows: ‘I am willing 
to believe that physics is general in the sense that it implies that any event which consists of a monetary 
exchange … has a true description in the vocabulary of physics and in virtue of which it falls under the 
laws of physics. But banal considerations suggest that a description which covers all such events must be 
wildly disjunctive. Some monetary exchanges involve strings of wampum. Some involve dollar bills. And 
some involve signing one’s name to a check. What are the chances that a disjunction of physical predicates 
which covers all these events (i.e., a disjunctive predicate which can form the fight hand side of a bridge 
law of the form “x is a monetary exchange ⇔ ...”) expresses a physical natural kind?’  
9 A version of this model, outside the context of free will, can also be found in List and Pivato (2015). For a 
related formal analysis of multi-level systems, see Butterfield (2012).  
10 An important consequence of this is that the set of linguistically expressible propositions may be a proper 
subset of the set of all possible subsets of Ω. If the language is countable (which it typically is), the former 
set is also countable, while the latter may well be uncountable. As is standard, we define the conjunction of 
two propositions as the intersection of the two sets of histories; their disjunction as the union; and the 
negation of a proposition as its complement in Ω. 
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segment up to time t and diverge, at most, thereafter. Necessity and possibility can now 
be defined in the standard way. A physical-level proposition p is necessary in history h at 
time t (i.e., ‘!p’ is true in h at t) if and only if p is true in all histories h' accessible from 
h at t. Similarly, p is possible in history h at time t (i.e., ‘!p’ is true in h at t) if and only 
if p is true in some history h' accessible from h at t. 
So far, we have defined propositions and modal operators at the physical level. To 
introduce agential-level propositions and modal operators, we need to re-describe our 
system accordingly. Let S denote the set of all possible states as described at the agential 
level. Each state in S may specify, for instance, the relevant agents’ mental attitudes and 
their actions at the time in question, as well as the state of their environment at a 
macroscopic level of grain, but not the precise micro-physical configuration of all 
underlying elementary particles. In line with non-reductive physicalism, I assume that the 
agential states in S supervene on the physical states in S, but are multiply realizable, 
meaning that there exists a many-to-one mapping σ from S into S which assigns to each 
physical state the corresponding agential state. Like physical states, different agential 
states are mutually exclusive. An agential history is a temporal path of the system 
through its agential-level state space. Formally, this is a function from T into S rather 
than S, and we now use the notation h rather than h. Naturally, each physical history h 
gives rise to a corresponding agential history h. It is obtained by applying the 
supervenience mapping σ to the given physical history. Formally, we write h = σ(h). Let 
Ω  denote the set of all possible agential histories. An agential-level proposition, then, is 
(extensionally) a subset of Ω , where the proposition is true at some agential history h if 
and only if h belongs to that subset. Again, we normally use a sentence in a suitable 
language to express such a proposition.   
We define necessity and possibility at the agential level in exact analogy to 
necessity and possibility at the physical level, using the symbols !  and "  instead of ! 
and !. An agential history h is accessible from another such history h' at time t if and 
only if the two histories have the same initial segment up to time t and diverge, at most, 
thereafter. An agential-level proposition p is necessary in agential history h at time t (i.e., 
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‘!p’ is true in h at t) if and only if p is true in all agential histories h' accessible from h 
at t. Similarly, p is possible in agential history h at time t (i.e., ‘"p’ is true in h at t) if 
and only if p is true in some histories h' accessible from h at t. 
It should be clear that agential-level propositions, whose extensions are subsets of 
Ω , are formally distinct from physical-level propositions, whose extensions are subsets of 
Ω. Technically, the set of all agential-level propositions, which we may denote P(Ω ), 
forms an algebra that is distinct from the algebra of all physical-level propositions, which 
we may denote P(Ω).11 Agential-level propositions are not contained in P(Ω), just as 
physical-level propositions are not contained in P(Ω ).12 Likewise, the modal operators 
for each of these two levels are distinct, and they range over different domains of 
propositions. That is, the physical-level modal operators ! and ! range over the 
propositions in P(Ω), while the agential-level modal operators !  and "  range over the 
propositions in P(Ω ).13 
                                                
11 An algebra is a set of propositions that is closed under conjunction (intersection), disjunction (union), 
and negation (complementation). One might be tempted to define P(Ω) and P(Ω ) as the power sets of 
Ω and Ω , respectively (where a set’s power set is the set of all its subsets). But, as noted, we normally 
express propositions in some language, and therefore it is more useful to define P(Ω) and P(Ω ) as the sets 
of propositions that are expressible in, respectively, the appropriate physical-level and agential-level 
languages. These sets may be smaller than the power sets of Ω and Ω , respectively (recall footnote 10). 
12 At most, P(Ω ) might be isomorphic to a sub-algebra of P(Ω). This will be the case, in particular, if P(Ω) 
is defined as the power set of Ω. For each p in P(Ω ), it will then be the case that σ–1(p) is in P(Ω), where 
σ–1(p) = {h∈Ω : σ(h)∈p}. However, if we take P(Ω) to be the set of all propositions that are expressible in 
our physical-level language, as suggested earlier, then there is no guarantee that, for every p in P(Ω ), 
σ–1(p) is in P(Ω). For example, the set of physical-level histories σ–1(p) may not be expressible as a finite 
disjunction in the relevant language. This point was also made in List and Pivato (2015, Section 7). 
13 At each time t, we can think of ! (respectively, !) as a function that assigns to each proposition p in 
P(Ω) a new proposition !p (respectively, !p) in P(Ω). Formally, at time t, for any p in P(Ω),  
!p = {h ∈ Ω: p is true in all histories h' accessible from h at t}, and 
!p = {h ∈ Ω: p is true in at least one history h' accessible from h at t}. 
Similarly, at each time t, we can think of !  (respectively, " ) as a function that assigns to each proposition 
p in P(Ω ) a new proposition ! p (respectively, " p) in P(Ω ). The definition matches that for ! 
(respectively, !), except that we must now replace all lower-level histories h and h', which are elements of 
Ω, with higher-level histories h and h', which are elements of Ω .   
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7. Physical-level determinism is compatible with agential-level indeterminism 
One feature of this picture of the relationship between the physical and the agential levels 
is that it renders physical-level determinism compatible with agential-level indeterminism 
(List 2014).14 To see how it does this, suppose physical-level determinism is true. 
Formally, this means that whenever two histories h and h' in the set Ω begin in the same 
way (i.e., they share some initial state or segment), they must be identical. Figure 1 
(reproduced from List 2014) gives an example. It displays six histories over five time 
periods (from t = 1 in the bottom row to t = 5 in the top row), which make up the set Ω. 
The dots represent physical states, so that S is the set of all dots. Determinism clearly 
holds in this case, as any initial segment of any history has only one possible continuation.  
But now suppose that the supervenience relation between physical states and 
agential states is such that all physical states that fall into the same cell in the rectangular 
grid give rise to the same agential state. This is an instance of a many-to-one 
supervenience relation. It implies, for example, that the six physical states at time t = 1 
are partitioned into only two distinct agential states, represented by the third and fourth 
cells from the left. Figure 2 (also reproduced from List 2014) displays the resulting 
agential histories, which make up the set Ω . Thick dots represent agential states, so that S 
is the set of all thick dots. As we can see in Figure 2, indeterminism is true of agential 
histories in spite of determinism at the physical level. Two or more agential histories can 
begin in the same way and then branch off in different directions. 
                                                
14 For formally related results outside the context of free will, see Werndl (2009), Butterfield (2012), and 
List and Pivato (2015). 
Figure 2: World histories at the agential level





Figure 1: World histories at the physical level






The same points can be made using the definition of determinism from the 
consequence argument. Recall that, in that argument, determinism is expressed by the 
formula !((p0 & l) → p), where proposition p0 describes the fully specified physical state 
of the world at some past time, proposition l describes the laws of physics, and 
proposition p can, for the moment, be any other physical-level proposition we are 
interested in. (We thus temporarily set aside the fact that, in the original consequence 
argument, p has an agential-level interpretation.) 
In our example, p0 is a physical-level proposition that describes the initial state of 
the system. If the actual physical history is the left-most history in Figure 1 – call it h – 
then p0 says that the initial state is given by the left-most dot in the bottom row. Formally, 
p0 is the set of all histories that begin in that state, i.e., p0 = {h}. Proposition l, which 
describes the laws, can be taken to be the set Ω in its entirety; we have already built the 
laws into the specification of Ω. Now it is easy to see that, for any physical-level 
proposition p that is true in history h (i.e., any subset of Ω containing h), we have 
!((p0 & l) → p) in history h at any time t. A history in which p is false is simply 
inaccessible at any time from any history with the initial state described by p0, under the 
given laws. So, at the physical level, our system is deterministic according to the 
definition from the consequence argument. 
By contrast, if we re-describe our illustrative system at the agential level and ask 
whether it is deterministic at that level, we must consider the agential-level version of the 
relevant formula, namely ! ((p0 & l) → p). Here proposition p0 describes the system’s 
initial state at the agential level, proposition l describes the system’s agential-level laws 
(which supervene on the physical laws), and proposition p can be any agential-level 
proposition we are interested in.  
Unlike its physical-level counterpart, ! ((p0 & l) → p) is not always true for all 
true agential-level propositions p. Suppose that the actual history is the left-most one in 
Figure 2; call it h. Then p0 says that the initial agential state is given by the left-most 
thick dot in the bottom row; formally, this is the set of all agential histories that begin in 
that state (so, p0 has three elements). In analogy to proposition l above, proposition l is Ω  
in its entirety; the laws have already been built into our specification of the set of possible 
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histories, and l (= Ω ) is the projection of the physical-level proposition l (= Ω) under the 
supervenience relation. To give an example of a true agential-level proposition p for 
which ! ((p0 & l) → p) is false at time 1, simply take p = {h}, a proposition that 
describes the full truth about the actual history. Since two histories in which p is false are 
accessible from history h at time 1 and both of these histories are contained in the 
intersection of p0 and l, we have "~((p0&l) → p) in history h at time 1 (here ‘~’ stands 
for ‘not’). Thus, under the present definition, our system is indeterministic at the agential 
level, despite being deterministic at the physical one. 
7. Two valid arguments, neither of which establishes the incompatibility of free will 
and physical-level determinism 
Let me return to the consequence argument. If what I have argued is correct, we can 
identify two valid arguments that are in the vicinity of the original consequence 
argument, but neither of which establishes the incompatibility of free will and physical-
level determinism. 
The first argument is formulated entirely at the physical level, where propositions 
are subsets of Ω, and it looks, on the surface, much like the original argument. As before, 
propositions p0 and l describe, respectively, an initial physical state and the fundamental 
physical laws, and the necessity operator ! is defined for physical-level propositions. 
Proposition p, however, cannot literally describe an agent’s action, but can at most 
describe some physical base facts on which the action supervenes, with all the 
qualifications mentioned above (recall especially footnote 12). The operator N, similarly, 
is not defined at the physical level and must be replaced by something that can be glossed 
in physical terms. Accordingly, I will replace ‘Np’ with ‘~!~p’, i.e., ‘not-p is 
impossible’. This substitution immediately validates both Rule Alpha and Rule Beta. We 
then obtain the following argument: 
Step 1: !((p0 & l) → p) (from determinism) 
Step 2: !(p0 → (l → p)) (from step 1 and logic) 
Step 3: ~!~(p0→(l→p))  (from Rule Alpha) 
 13 
Step 4: ~!~p0   (a premise) 
Step 5: ~!~(l → p)  (from steps 3, 4, and Rule Beta) 
Step 6: ~!~l   (a premise) 
Step 7: ~!~p   (from steps 5, 6, and Rule Beta) 
Given the duality of ! and !, a simpler exposition would of course be possible, without 
invoking Rules Alpha and Beta, but I have presented the argument in a way that mirrors 
the structure of the original consequence argument. The argument is clearly valid. 
However, since p is not the originally intended action-proposition and N is not the 
originally intended agential modal operator, the argument only establishes a logical 
relationship between certain physical-level propositions: under the given premises, 
physical-level determinism renders it impossible for the physical-level proposition p to be 
false. This hardly establishes the incompatibility of determinism and free will. It only 
restates a point we have long known, namely that, under physical-level determinism, the 
initial physical state of the world together with the laws of physics necessitates all 
subsequent physical states and thereby all physical-level truths about them. Moreover, the 
argument is formulated at a level at which we could not plausibly expect to find free will. 
After all, free will is a feature of intentional agents, and intentional agency is a higher-
level phenomenon, not a physical one.  
The second argument is formulated entirely at the agential level, and it is also 
structurally similar to the consequence argument, though now propositions are subsets of 
Ω  rather than Ω. Here we take propositions p0 and l to describe an initial state at the 
coarse-grained, agential level and the laws governing that level, respectively, and we take 
the operator !  to be defined for agential-level propositions, as explained earlier. Since 
everything is framed in agential-level terms, we are now able to take p to be an action-
proposition – thereby matching van Inwagen’s intended interpretation – and also to 
interpret N in the intended way. Specifically, we can take ‘Np’ to mean ‘~"~p’, i.e., 
‘not-p is agentially impossible’, or more informally: ‘there is nothing any agent could 
 14 
have done to render p false’.15 Again, Rules Alpha and Beta are valid under this 
substitution. The argument now runs as follows: 
Step 1: !((p0 & l) → p) (from agential-level determinism) 
Step 2: !(p0 → (l → p)) (from step 1 and logic) 
Step 3: ~"~(p0 → (l → p))  (from Rule Alpha) 
Step 4: ~"~p0   (a premise) 
Step 5: ~"~(l → p)  (from steps 3, 4, and Rule Beta) 
Step 6: ~"~l   (a premise) 
Step 7: ~"~p   (from steps 5, 6, and Rule Beta) 
This line of reasoning, I think, is impeccable, and it does indeed establish an 
incompatibilist conclusion of sorts: it establishes that agential-level determinism rules out 
free will. If it turned out that the world was deterministic at the agential level – for 
instance, because the laws of psychology were such that human agents are deterministic 
systems – then there could be no such thing as free will (as also conceded in List 2014). 
But the argument is distinct from the original consequence argument, which purports to 
show the incompatibility of free will and physical-level determinism. 
8. A final objection 
We have seen that the consequence argument is well formed only if all its constituent 
propositions are expressed in the same language, and that neither a purely physical-level 
language nor a purely agential-level language is fit for purpose. A physical-level 
language fails to capture the intended conclusion about agential abilities, and an agential-
level language fails to capture the intended premise about physical-level determinism.  
Now, a critic might concede these points and yet insist that the consequence 
argument can be rescued through the use of some ‘mixed-level’ language. In particular, 
the critic might say, cross-level statements are not always ill formed: for example, we 
                                                
15 Note further that, on this interpretation and the semantics of "  introduced above, the truth of p is also a 
consequence of Np, as required under van Inwagen’s intended interpretation of N. 
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routinely talk about issues such as supervenience, and we thereby express statements 
about the relationship between properties at different levels. If we can talk about the 
supervenience of agential properties on physical ones in a ‘mixed-level’ language, then 
we should also be able to express the consequence argument in a similar way. Doesn’t 
this show that the argument’s mixing of levels can be made to work, after all?16  
To respond to this objection, we must begin by noting a key desideratum that the 
mixed-level language would have to fulfil in order to express the consequence argument 
successfully. The language would have to enable us, not merely to talk about the 
argument from some external (‘meta-linguistic’) perspective, but to assert the argument – 
i.e., to use its constituent propositions, in an ‘object-language’ way, not just to offer 
external commentary on them. Arguably, when we engage in supervenience talk, we 
often adopt an external perspective, for instance by stepping outside any particular level 
of description and then talking about how what is true at one level relates to what is true 
at another.17 For instance, when we consider the level-specific sets of histories Ω and Ω , 
together with the associated algebras P(Ω) and P(Ω ), and talk about a function, such as 
σ, that relates them to one another, we are, in effect, adopting an external perspective. 
The language in which we are describing the supervenience mapping σ is best understood 
as referring to the algebras P(Ω) and P(Ω ) from the outside. We are not using that 
language to assert the propositions in those algebras; we are using it only to analyse how 
they relate to one another. What we need, in order to express the consequence argument 
in the intended way, is a language in which we can assert all of the propositions the 
argument involves. 
One way to construct such a ‘mixed-level’ language would be to associate it with 
the smallest algebra containing both P(Ω) and P(Ω ). This algebra is obtained by taking 
the union of P(Ω) and P(Ω ) and closing it under complementation, conjunction, and 
disjunction. Clearly, we would then be able to express every proposition from P(Ω) and 
every proposition from P(Ω ), as well as all logical combinations of these propositions. 
                                                
16 Thanks to Jonathan Birch for a very helpful email correspondence that has prompted me to address this 
objection. 
17 This may even involve attaching explicit ‘level indices’ – e.g., through notational conventions – to all the 
propositions we are referring to, so as to indicate the levels to which they belong. 
 16 
Moreover, since P(Ω) contains propositions involving the operators ! and !, and P(Ω ) 
contains propositions involving the operators !  and " , our new language would be able 
to express both physical-level and agential-level modal notions. (Note that ‘~"~’ or 
equivalently ‘! ’ could be interpreted as ‘N’.) 
Is this enough to rehabilitate the consequence argument? The answer is ‘no’, for the 
following reason. While our mixed-level language would allow us to express physical-
level propositions, agential-level propositions, and composite propositions involving 
conjunctions and disjunctions of the two (and thereby also material conditionals), it 
would still not allow us to express the kinds of mixed propositions needed for the 
consequence argument. Recall that the argument involves not just conjunctions or 
disjunctions of propositions from the two different levels (an example of such a 
proposition would be p0 & !p); it involves placing physical-level propositions within 
the scope of an agential-level modal operator, as in Np0 or, to use this paper’s notation, 
!p0. And this is where the category mistake crops up. 
Even though our mixed-level language allows us to form conjunctions, 
disjunctions, and material conditionals involving propositions from both P(Ω) and P(Ω ), 
the agential-level modal operators !  and "  occurring in such mixed-level propositions 
must still range over the propositions from P(Ω ). So, while a mixed-level proposition 
such as p0 & !p is well-formed – being a conjunction of a proposition from P(Ω) and a 
proposition from P(Ω ) – an expression such as !p0 is not.  
What is wrong with the latter expression? Its lack of well-formedness lies in the 
semantics of ! . In brief, p0 is outside the domain of the operator ! . We can think of that 
operator as a function defined on P(Ω ) (as formally explained in footnote 12). It yields 
well-formed propositions when applied to elements of P(Ω ), but not when applied to 
propositions outside P(Ω ). Thus !p is well formed, while !p0 is not.  
Let us see what would happen if we tried to truth-evaluate the expression !p0. 
Recall that, for any proposition p within the scope of ! :  
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The expression ‘!p’ is true in agential history h at time t if and only if p is 
true in all agential histories h' accessible from h at t.  
A first difficulty with applying this formula to our mixed-level language is that the loci of 
truth-evaluation for propositions in that language are not agential-level histories (which 
are elements of Ω ), but physical-level histories (which are elements of Ω). Only the latter 
are sufficiently fine-grained to settle all propositions from both P(Ω) and P(Ω ). In order 
to render the above-quoted formula applicable to our mixed-level case, we would 
therefore have to stipulate that 
‘!p0’ is true in a physical-level history h (at time t) if and only if it is true in 
the agential-level history h that supervenes on h (i.e., where h = σ(h)).  
The formula for !  could then be applied to the right-hand side of this biconditional. 
However, even if we grant this response to the first difficulty with truth-evaluating 
expressions such as !p0, there is a further difficulty. 
Our formula would imply that ‘!p0’ is true in an agential-level history h at time t 
if and only if  
(*) p0 is true in all agential histories h' accessible from h at t. 
But p0, being a physical-level proposition, is too fine-grained to be settled – in general – 
by any agential-level history h'. Physical-level propositions such as p0 do not generally 
have well-defined truth-values in agential-level histories. An agential-level history such 
as h', which belongs to Ω  rather than Ω, is neither an element of p0 nor an element of its 
complement (Ω\p0), and hence it does not ‘decide’ between p0 and its negation (recall that 
~p0 = Ω\p0). To illustrate, p0 may specify some micro-physical properties that are present 
in some physical realizers of h' and absent in others. Then p0 will not have a well-defined 
truth-value in h' at all. In consequence, clause (*) is ill-defined, and the entire semantic 
formula for !  is not applicable to the expression ‘!p0’. For that formula to yield a well-
defined truth-value, the proposition within the scope of the !  operator must have a 
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determinate truth-value at each agential-level history to which the formula refers. 
Agential-level propositions meet this requirement; physical-level propositions do not.18 
To be sure, one could try to respond to this problem by offering a more dramatic 
redefinition of the semantics of the agential-level modal operators !  and " . But this 
move would be question begging. It would then be unclear whether the redefinition 
would correctly capture the intended agential-level modal notions. Indeed, if what I have 
argued is correct, it wouldn’t. The agential ‘can’ is a higher-level notion; it is not to be 
found at the fine-grained level at which any such redefinition would attempt to relocate it. 
9. Concluding remarks 
I have argued that the consequence argument involves a category mistake: it conflates 
two different levels of description, especially by placing physical-level propositions 
within the scope of agential-level modal operators. We can defend free will against the 
argument by carefully separating these two different levels of description. 
The picture of free will that we end up with is nonetheless incompatibilist in one 
sense. As I have pointed out, the agential-level variant of the consequence argument 
establishes the incompatibility of free will with agential-level determinism. This supports 
a form of ‘agential-level incompatibilism’. But crucially – though I cannot defend this 
point here – there is no reason to think that our best theory of intentional agency will 
support determinism at the agential level. And so, relative to that level, we have perfectly 
good grounds for taking free will to be a real phenomenon. Thus a position that we might 
call ‘agential-level libertarianism’ is entirely viable.  
Furthermore, since indeterminism at the agential level is compatible with 
determinism at the physical one, the present kind of libertarianism is, in another 
important sense, a compatibilist position. One might express this point by saying that it is 
‘intra-level incompatibilist’, but ‘cross-level compatibilist’. This, I think, justifies calling 
the resulting view ‘compatibilist libertarianism’. 
                                                
18 The only physical-level propositions that might conceivably be truth-evaluated in agential histories are 
ones that are inverse images of sets of agential histories, i.e., propositions of the special form p = σ–1(p), 
where p is some subset of Ω . Strictly speaking, however, our truth predicate for physical-level propositions 
is defined only for subsets of Ω, while that for agential-level propositions is defined only for subsets of Ω . 
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Needless to say, more arguments are needed to show that we really do have free 
will.19 But the present discussion should help us respond to at least one prominent 
argument against free will, namely van Inwagen’s argument for the incompatibility of 
free will and physical-level determinism.20 
References 
Arvan, M. (2013) ‘A New Theory of Free Will’, Philosophical Forum 44(1): 1-48. 
Beebee, H., and A. Mele (2002) ‘Humean Compatibilism’, Mind 111(442): 201-223. 
Bennett, M., D. Dennett, P. Hacker, and J. Searle (2007) Neuroscience and Philosophy: 
Brain, Mind, and Language, New York (Columbia University Press). 
Butterfield, J. (2012) ‘Laws, Causation and Dynamics at Different Levels’, Interface 
Focus 2(1): 101-114. 
Dennett, D. (2003) Freedom Evolves, London (Penguin).  
Fodor, J. (1974) ‘Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)’, 
Synthese 28: 97-115. 
Glynn, L. (2010) ‘Deterministic Chance’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 
61: 51-80. 
Kane, R. (ed.) (2002) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford (Oxford University 
Press). 
Kenny, A. (1978) Freewill and Responsibility, London (Routledge). 
List, C. (2014) ‘Free will, determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise’, Noûs 48: 
156-178.  
List, C., and P. Menzies (2009) ‘Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Limits of the 
Exclusion Principle’, Journal of Philosophy CVI: 475-502. 
List, C., and P. Menzies (forthcoming) ‘My brain made me do it: The exclusion argument 
against free will, and what’s wrong with it’, in H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and H. 
Price (eds.), Making a Difference, Oxford (Oxford University). 
List, C., and M. Pivato (2015) ‘Emergent Chance’, Philosophical Review 124(1): 119-
152. 
                                                
19 For some further ingredients of the defence of free will, see List and Menzies (forthcoming). 
20 Of course, my claim that the consequence argument is ultimately unsuccessful should not be interpreted 
as diminishing the invaluable role the argument has played in sharpening the debate on free will. 
 20 
Maier, J. (2015) ‘The Agentive Modalities’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
XC(1): 113-134. 
Manafu, A. (forthcoming) ‘A Novel Approach to Emergence in Chemistry’, in E. Scerri 
and L. McIntyre (eds.), Philosophy of Chemistry: Growth of a New Discipline, 
Heidelberg (Springer).  
Menzies, P. (forthcoming) ‘The Consequence Argument Disarmed: An Interventionist 
Perspective’, in H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference, 
Oxford (Oxford University). 
Putnam, H. (1975) ‘Philosophy and our mental life’, in Mind, Language and Reality, 
Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), pp. 291-303. 
Rickless, S. C. (2000), ‘Locke on the Freedom to Will’, The Locke Newsletter 31: 43-67. 
Van Inwagen, P. (1975) ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism’, 
Philosophical Studies 27: 185-199. 
Van Inwagen, P. (1983) An Essay on Free Will, Oxford (Clarendon Press). 
Van Inwagen, P. (1989) ‘When is the Will Free?’, Philosophical Perspectives 3: 399-422. 
Vihvelin, K. (2000) ‘Libertarian Compatibilism’, Philosophical Perspectives 14: 139-
166. 
Vihvelin, K. (2011) ‘Arguments for Incompatibilism’, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition). 
Vihvelin, K. (2013) Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn’t Matter, 
Oxford (Oxford University Press). 
Werndl, C. (2009) ‘Are deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions 
observationally equivalent?’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40(3): 232-242.  
